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ABSTRACT
This is an essay review of the literature on utility maximization as a managerial
objective in pro team sports. It ends up that there is a heretofore-unrecognized
parallel development of the idea, in English football by Sloane [Scottish Journal
of Political Economy (1971), 17, 121] and in North American pro sports by
Quirk and El Hodiri, presented in that same year but not published as a confer-
ence proceeding until 1974. I review these works and place the rest of the extant
literature chronologically, noting their level of generality along a couple of
dimensions. I also observe a lack of a clear reference lineage in this literature
and suggest one. Adopting it should aid future researchers who are trying to
place their work in the context of this literature. [It would have helped me, for
example.]
I INTRODUCTION
In this paper, the goal is to track the development of the literature on one
form of managerial objective in pro team sports, namely, utility maximization.
In the literature, I could ﬁnd, the original application to pro sports is solely
attributed to Sloane (1971). However, joint work by James Quirk and
Mohammed El Hodiri presented at a Brookings conference in that same year
1971, but not published until later (1974), exhaustively formalized utility max-
imization as a managerial objective in pro team sports, in a general dynamic
model.1 This seems to be an interesting case where great minds really were
thinking alike, and quite independently one from the others. In reviewing all
of the subsequent literature, I will refer to this as the Sloane/Quirk and El
Hodiri formulation, or S/Q-EH for short.
Table 1 shows a curious turn of events concerning the S/Q-EH formulation
in the subsequent literature. Directly following the line of utility maximization
as a managerial objective in pro team sports, the two original works are not
*University of Michigan
1Others need not agree, but it is clear to me that Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) was in pro-
gress contemporaneous to Sloane (1971) also evidenced by the publication of their other,
proﬁt maximization piece at exactly the same date (El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971).
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consistently recognized as such. Most likely this was just an artifact of accessi-
bility, extended gaps between publication dates, and the fact that once a liter-
ature begins to build it is unlikely to look back.
But in this case, the failure to look back misses some important develop-
ments in sports economics and relative to social science in general.2 First,
Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) is a full-blown dynamic treatment, all the way to
league equilibrium results, that is not to be found anywhere in the subsequent
literature.3 Second, it ends up that they use a contest success function that
they had formally introduced in their earlier proﬁt maximization paper (El
Hodiri and Quirk, 1971) a few years prior to its common attribution in social
science to Tullock (1980).4 The contest success function is ‘the industry stan-
dard’ in modern game theory equilibrium models of the interaction of team
owners/club directors through their leagues. On the basis of these two ﬁnd-
ings, bringing this neglected work back into the mainstream is my most
important contribution to this special edition.
After presenting Sloane (1971) and Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) (in that
order for reasons I make clear) in the next two sections of the paper, the rest
of the literature explicitly using utility maximization as a managerial objective
Table 1
Citations comparison
S Q-EH K R V DGL MR
Sloane (1971) .
Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) . .
Kesenne (1996) x x .
Rascher (1997) 0 0 c .
Vrooman (1997) 0 x c c .
Dietl et al. (2011b) x 0 x x x .
Madden and Robinson (2012) x 0 x x 0 c .
Note: Dietl et al. (2011b) do not cite Vrooman (1997) or Vrooman (2000) where the ‘sportsman’ owner is
reprised, but they do cite his later work (Vrooman, 2007, 2009) where the ‘sportsman’ owner also appears.
Dietl et al. (2011b) and Madden and Robinson (2012), do not cite Kesenne (1996) directly but they do
cite Kesenne’s various later works that employ the win maximization model, especially his overview of
that theory in Kesenne (2007). 0 = no citation, x = citation, c = contemporary publications (no citation
should be expected).
2 And this is not the ﬁrst time. In another retrospective, Fort (2006a) points out that Rot-
tenberg (1956) had independently deduced and utilized the simplest version of a theorem used
by Coase (1960) (Sanderson and Siegfried, 2006, note this but spend no time on it). Rotten-
berg used it to develop what is now referred to as the ‘invariance principle’ while Coase used
it as a straw man concept to set up the problems plaguing the handling social costs.
3 Rascher (1997) provides a dynamic notation but then does nothing with it. There also
are two other articles employing dynamic analysis but were deemed too far aﬁeld from the
pro team focus here. Maxcy (2004) models long-term contracting with expected utility analy-
sis. Fort (2006b) uses expected utility analysis to model the basics of inter-temporal carrying
of talent from the minor league to the major league.
4 Skaperdas (1996) traces the use of contest success functions, per se, to Tullock (1980) but
notes they are similar to ‘probabilistic choice functions’ used a few years earlier in other
applications.
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in pro team sports is organized chronologically in a separate section. As they
are presented, their generality in relation to preceding works is noted along
the lines of (1) capturing the S/Q-EH utility maximization framework and (2)
general theoretical treatment of the utility function, itself, and (3) treatment of
the contest success function. The other usual dimension of generality in eco-
nomics – from dynamic to static – doesn’t matter as there is no dynamic treat-
ment after Quirk and El Hodiri (1974). Literatures typically evolve in the
other direction, from restricted static to dynamic, but that is just another
interesting thing that distinguishes the literature on utility maximization as a
managerial objective in pro team sports. The most general treatment actually
came before the less general. The penultimate section is about the lack of a
clearly stated lineage in this literature and a suggestion to remedy that in the
future. Conclusions round out the paper.
II THE FOOTBALL CLUB AS A UTILITY MAXIMISER
I begin with Sloane (1971) because his was a completely non-mathematical
presentation and the utility maximization idea was motivated by factors dis-
tinct to English football compared to North American pro leagues. Sloane’s
(1971) article title is in two parts: ‘The Economics of Professional Football’
and ‘The Football Club As A Utility Maximiser’. While the focus in this spe-
cial issue is on the latter, lest we forget, Sloane (1971) did for English football
what Rottenberg (1956) did for baseball, namely, cover a multitude of league-
speciﬁc labor, industrial organization, and regulation topics. I heartily recom-
mend the entire Sloane (1971) paper to all readers with the caution that each
paragraph is loaded with signiﬁcant content.
Sloane cites his inspiration as the early utility maximization approaches of
Williamson (1963) and Marris (1964).5 Sloane (1969) had already bridged
the gap from the more general ‘managerial’ economics to sports economics
a bit earlier. So, there is a nice smooth ﬂow from management objectives
from general economics to their application in sports economics in Sloane
(1971).
As with all seminal ideas, eventually they become textbook stuﬀ. There is
this in the textbook by Downward and Dawson (2000, p. 28), ‘Sloane rec-
ognized the possibility that divorce between ownership and control in asso-
ciation football might permit managers to pursue non-proﬁt goals, for
instance, utility maximization (subject to minimum proﬁt).’ Sloane (1971)
gave careful consideration to the types of managerial objectives extant in
the literature at the time. While rejecting proﬁt maximization outright for
English football, there are self-professed elements of security maximization
(Rothschild, 1947) and sales maximization (Baumol, 1957) included in his
utility maximization framework. For Sloane (1971), the following could
come to govern managers under situations that might characterize English
football clubs as opposed to individually owned teams in North America –
5 Sloane also notes that Rottenberg (1956) puzzled over management objectives before set-
tling on proﬁt maximization for Major League Baseball.
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In the choice of talent level, club directors might maximize (Sloane, 1971,
p. 136):
U½P;A;X; ðpR  p0  TÞ; subject to pR þ FxPp0 þ T ð1Þ
U is the club director’s utility function, P the playing success, A the average
attendance, X the health of the league, pR the recorded proﬁt, Fx the external
club ﬁnancial resources, p0 the minimum after-tax proﬁt, T is the taxes.
Sloane (1971) oﬀers nothing in terms of any speciﬁcation of U, perhaps
because he doesn’t do anything with expression (1) except specify it as a
guide. P translates most directly to winning. A is self-explanatory, although
the speciﬁcation of attendance relative to winning, and its role in diﬀerent
places in the speciﬁcation, are not and Sloane oﬀers nothing on these except
that they relate to revenue maximization. X, the ‘health’ of the league, had
already been set up in the earlier part of the paper on two dimensions.
‘Mutual independence’ is the requirement of the survival of all clubs in the
league (he cites Rottenberg, 1956; Neale, 1964; Jones, 1969). But it is Rotten-
berg’s (1956) ‘uncertainty of outcome’ hypothesis that sticks with the rest of
Sloane’s (1971) formulation, as well as with the works that followed (p. 136),
‘Utility is derived from the health of the league because it is better to win a
keenly fought competition than to win easily.’
A portion of this speciﬁcation would also play a large role in future work
and Sloane (1971) wrestled with this one a bit. Surely, potential investors had
to be given some signal of team vitality. Further, club directors would not
bankrupt their private wealth position pursuing this utility. So Sloane (1971)
arrived at the idea of ‘acceptable’ proﬁt, that is, recorded actual proﬁt net of
some required minimum level and taxes. Later works sometimes adjust this
part of the speciﬁcation to a simpler break-even constraint.
Of course, the most famous distinction in Sloane (1971) is the utility maxi-
mization framework oﬀered as most ﬁtting for English football. However, an
element in Sloane (1971) that would endure and drive diﬀerent paths in the
literature on sports teams and leagues was his immediate observation that the
managerial objective shoe must ﬁt the wearer (p. 1); ‘Whilst several North
American contributions on the economics of sports exist. . . there appears to
have been no attempt to apply economic theory to the particular case of Brit-
ish professional football. . .’ The diﬀerent treatment of management objectives
in diﬀerent league structures in diﬀerent countries, now commonplace, was
the opening observation in Sloane’s (1971) seminal work.
Again, Sloane (1971) really only uses the formulation in expression (1) as a
descriptive organizer; he does not perform the optimizing calculus or push the
formulation to an equilibrium speciﬁcation. Sloane (1971) also spends nearly
no time on some of the problems with this formulation. Attendance, perfor-
mance, and outcome uncertainty all appear as independent arguments in the
utility function based on his earlier sorting through the managerial objectives
literature. But surely they are also the primary determinants of ‘recorded
proﬁt’, a component of acceptable proﬁt that also appears in the utility
function.
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And what are the determinants of the mysterious Fx term, that is, ‘external
club ﬁnancial resources’? It is easy to think he was just leaving room for a
consumption-oriented club manager to put in their own personal wealth, as
well as the contributions of other fans (rather than dues) or investors. But this
raises an important issue. If people with suitable means are also fans, then
isn’t the champion of the league simply the club whose fans have the largest
Fx?
Neither does Sloane (1971) address the question of competition among
organizational structures, available to him as it reaches back in economics to
Alchian (1950). At the very least, there is a debate about whether anything
but proﬁt maximization can survive against other management objectives. But
no paper can do everything and others ably carried that part of the later liter-
ature.6
For example, early on, Dabscheck (1975) took a completely detailed look
at the actual behavior of Victoria Football League in Australia (now Austra-
lian Rules Football) and just argued forcefully that it could not be construed
in any way to resemble an organization interested in proﬁt maximization,
especially in the characteristic overpayment of talent. This, of course, was
right up Sloane’s utility maximization alley as he started there as well and
noted that utility maximization would lead to plowing back what would
otherwise be proﬁt into the primary factor that generated wins, namely, play-
ers. A bit later, empirical estimates of pay dramatically in excess of marginal
revenue product (MRP) were taken as evidence contrary to proﬁt maximiza-
tion (Cairns et al., 1986; and Szymanski, 2003).
I do not wish to stray too far aﬁeld, but it is worth noting two things about
the MRP ‘controversies’. First, utility maximization is not the only model that
leads to talent investment in excess MRP. Baumol (1957) showed long ago
that revenue (sales) maximization would do the same thing. Indeed, in his jus-
tiﬁcation for including attendance, Sloane (1971) himself recognized that this
had an element of sales maximization to it.
Second, while pay in excess of MRP is consistent with owner motivations
other than proﬁt, it is also consistent with ineﬀective measurement of MRP.
There is just as much controversy over the estimation of MRP as there is over
anything else. A player’s MRP is not just their gate contribution, or even their
gate plus TV revenue contribution. In the modern context of sports, the MRP
avenues are varied and far-reaching. For example, a share of the revenue from
a college football game played in an NFL stadium (as are all college national
championship games in the United States.) can easily be traced to NFL
football players. The NFL owner might not have even obtained the stadium
without the value of their NFL aﬃliation and players, as well as owners,
6 Cairns et al. (1986) detail the issue and the early empirical work that was bound to ensue
on proﬁt maximization vs. other managerial objectives. Szymanski (2003) and Garcia-del-
Barrio and Szymanski (2009) catch that literature pretty much up to date and the latter is
aimed at comparing two management objectives, empirically. Fort and Quirk, 2004, also take
up this same issue with the win maximization version of the S/Q-EH formulation, detailed
below.
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contribute to the creation of that ‘NFL value’. It poses an interesting mea-
surement challenge, but NFL player MRP includes some of that revenue gen-
erated by a college football game.
III THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF A PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUE
Quirk and El Hodiri (remember, presented 1971, published 1974) admit early
on in their formulation that proﬁt maximization may not ﬁt North American
pro sports team owners very well (p. 42):
The assumption that the actions of franchise owners are moti-
vated solely by proﬁts from operation of their franchise is
admittedly somewhat unrealistic. Owning a major-league fran-
chise carries with it prestige and publicity, and a wealthy owner
might view it simply as a type of consumption; for such a
‘sportsman’-owner, winning games rather than making money
might be the motivating factor.
As noted at the outset in the previous section, this opinion is based on spe-
ciﬁc reasoning relevant to what Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) observed in North
American pro sports rather than the separation of ownership and control that
Sloane (1971) observed in English football. In addition, Quirk and El Hodiri
(1974) provide both a dynamic speciﬁcation and the mathematical rigor
absent in Sloane (1971).
Where Sloane’s (1971) speciﬁcation in expression (1) was really just a device
to organize the elements of his speciﬁcation, Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) pro-
vide the calculus of dynamic decision making, along the lines in capital theory
covering optimal (inventory) control. Talent is the inventory and proﬁts
depend on talent through winning. After a full proﬁt maximization treatment,
Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) moves on to utility maximization. For their
dynamic version of utility maximization, in their choice of increments to talent
over time, team owners:
Max/
X
t
UiðCit; pitÞð1þ qÞt;
X
t
pitð1þ dÞt
" #
ð2Þ
subject to:
I jt  I jt1 ¼
X
j 6¼k x
jk
t þ x jNt  aI jt1; pitP 0;WitP 0; I jtP 0
Ui is the utility function of the owner of team i, Cit the Consumption of other
goods (than the probability of winning), time t, pit the vector of probabilities
that team i wins against the rest, time t, q the positive rate of subjective dis-
count, pit the net cash ﬂow from operating team i, period t, d the market rate
of interest per period, Ijt the inventory of playing skills, team j, time t, x
jk
t the
units of playing skill purchased from team k by team j, time t, xjNt the units of
playing skill drafted by team j, time t, a the rate of talent inventory deprecia-
tion, Wit the wealth of the owner of team j, period t, not including the team.
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Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) utilize the function / to set up a marginal rate
of substitution between utility from winning (which will have its own marginal
rate of substitution with consumption of other goods) and proﬁt. For exam-
ple, if / is independent of Ui then only proﬁt matters again. There are no
restrictions at all on the form of the utility function. There are speciﬁed con-
straints on q and wealth is speciﬁed as a diﬀerence equation in this dynamic
model. Proﬁt depends on attendance revenues from playing skills (winning)
and playing skills are dynamically adjusted (purchased and drafted) to aug-
ment previous inventory, minus the costs (including depreciation of skill).
Clearly, Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) are on the same wavelength as Sloane
(1971). All of Sloane’s (1971) elements are there – playing strength, attendance
through the proﬁt function, and non-negativity in both wealth and proﬁt in
the tradeoﬀ in (2). Finally, outcome uncertainty is handled via the determina-
tion of winning probabilities incorporating relative team talent choices. This
last deserves special attention.
Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) incorporate explicitly that the probability of
winning is driven by the ratio of a given team owner’s own choice (inventory)
of talent relative to the talent choices of each and every opponent (all
accounted for in the derivation of their equilibrium among n > 2 teams). The
probability of team i winning a game against team j, in period t, is speciﬁed
as (p. 59):
pijt ¼
Ijt
Iit þ Ijt
ð3Þ
Expression (3), which also appears in their earlier proﬁt maximization ver-
sion (El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971), is literally the contest success function a few
years before it appeared in Tullock (1980).7 So, as with Rottenberg and Coase
(see footnote 1), it would seem that economists working on sports had pre-
ceded the generally accepted attribution of the contest success function.
There are, of course, diﬀerences in the distribution of talent across the lea-
gue and the impact of some league policy impositions between proﬁt maximi-
zation and utility maximization in the dynamic Quirk and El Hodiri (1974)
speciﬁcation. Those are left to the interested reader, with this preview from
Quirk and El Hodiri (1974, p. 76):
In general, once the utility function contains as an element the
probability of winning as a source of satisfaction distinct from
its eﬀect on proﬁts, any earlier assertions about the relation-
ships between the distribution of playing strengths and the
drawing potentials of franchises must be severely qualiﬁed. In
principle, a suﬃciently wealthy owner concerned with ‘winning
7 Again, see Skaperdas (1996) for both the history and the treatment of much more general
speciﬁcations of the contest success function. Fort and Winfree (2009) also oﬀer some simple
numerical examples of the impact of diﬀerent choices of the form of the contest success func-
tion.
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at all costs’ could attain his objective even if he owned a fran-
chise in a small city, simply by spending enough money.
IV SUBSEQUENT WORK
In this section, the subsequent work explicitly using utility maximization as
a managerial objective, subject to some form of proﬁt constraint, in pro
team sports is organized chronologically and compared on some diﬀerent
aspects of the generality of their treatments.8 There are no dynamic treat-
ments in this part of the pro sports team literature after Quirk and El Hodi-
ri (1974) so the generality criteria cannot include the usual static/dynamic
comparison. My attempt at comparison settled on generality of the utility
function treatment and capture of the essential elements of the S/Q-EH for-
mulation.
Kesenne (1996) states that his win maximization framework is a simple
variety of utility maximization where only wins matter, subject to the club
manager breaking even. This is not entirely clear to this reader as Kesenne’s
(1996) formulation can be a simple statement that utility equals winning, but
going all the way back to Baumol (1957), it can also be simple revenue maxi-
mization (market share) in an oligopoly setting with the value of winning set
equal to unity. If it is utility maximization, it is surely the most restrictive
‘utility’ function in the literature. If it is sales maximization, perhaps it oﬀers
heretofore-unexplored implications and insights about the pursuit of market
share among pro sports leagues.
In any event, the win maximization problem in Kesenne (1996) is not for-
mally stated but matches9:
Max L subject to RðM;LÞ WLP0 ð4Þ
L is the units of playing talent for the team, relative to the talent in the rest
of the league, R the team revenue, M the team market size, W the talent cost
per unit.
As wins follow directly from L, he simply maximizes talent subject to
the clear break-even constraint. The impact of attendance is subsumed (but
not formally treated) in the revenue function. There is only the hint about
contest success in that units of talent for the team are ‘relative’ to the tal-
ent in the rest of the league but no formal contest success function appears
8 In their review article, Cairns et al. (1986) also cite a later monograph by Sloane (1980)
but I could not obtain a copy. It is worth noting that there are other works that utilize utility
maximization, but were deemed too far aﬁeld for the topic at hand of team owner/club direc-
tor utility maximization as a management objective (see also footnote 2). Gamrat and Sauer
(2000) compare utility maximization in the ownership of racehorses to a ‘pure ﬁnance’ alter-
native. Leeds (2002) and Leeds et al. (2004) cast college athletic directors as maximizing
‘prestige’ subject to a break-even budget constraint.
9 In the subsequent win maximization literature (reviewed in Kesenne, 2007), things are
only a bit more general: MaxWi þ giðP0i  Ri þ CLiÞ . That is, maximize winning explicitly
and the break-even requirement is in terms of a required proﬁt level, P0i in the Lagrange con-
straint. Everything from Kesenne (1996) of course carries through.
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(but it is incorporated in subsequent work in this literature, see Kesenne,
2007).
Baumol’s (1957) lesson, for those who remember, holds here. Kesenne
(1996) chooses to demonstrate this graphically: The talent (win, revenue) max-
imizer chooses L to equate the average revenue from winning, rather than the
marginal revenue from winning, to the cost of talent, W. Thus, talent invest-
ment is larger in the win-maximizing league than under proﬁt maximization.
Kesenne (1996) also shows that revenue sharing will increase competitive bal-
ance in this framework (and all manner of other league-imposed policies are
investigated in the subsequent win maximization literature; again, see Kes-
enne, 2007).
Rascher (1997) sets up utility maximization with an additively separable
utility function in winning and proﬁt:
Max Ui ¼ aiWini þ ð1 aiÞpi ð5Þ
ai is the proportion that owner i trades oﬀ winning and proﬁt in their utility
function, Wini the wins for team i, pi the proﬁts from winning, required non-
negative.
Comparing back to the S/Q-EH speciﬁcation, this utility function is more
restrictive than the general Q-EH utility function both in its content (no ‘other
consumption’) and in its form (linear in winning and proﬁts). Kesenne (1996)
is contained as a special case where ai=1 (along with the non-negative proﬁt
requirement). Attendance makes its way through the proﬁt function. All-in-
all, this speciﬁcation captures the essentials of the S/Q-EH formulation, albeit
in a restricted way.
Rascher (1997) also explicitly employs a contest success function, oblivious
to its previous development in either Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) or Tullock
(1980). Speciﬁcally, in Rascher’s (1997) expression (3):
Wini ¼ gðTi;TjÞ ¼
Xn
j6¼i
Ti
Ti þ Tj  pctgamij
 
ð6Þ
Ti is the Talent choice by team i, pctgamij the Percent of team i’s games
against team j.
As Rascher (1997) missed the entire S/EQ-H speciﬁcation in his references,
as well as being essentially contemporaneous with Kesenne (1996), it is no sur-
prise that there is a signiﬁcant amount of repetition of the ﬁndings in those
earlier works and there is no real need to reprise them here.
However, Rascher (1997) is the ﬁrst work where an added task for
empirical assessment appears. It is challenging enough to get an empirical
handle on the estimation of marginal eﬀects dictated by utility maximiza-
tion, but in addition, there is now the added empirical task of measuring
and estimating ai, the owner’s personal parameter governing the tradeoﬀ
between wins and proﬁts. Some of the results in Rascher (1997) hinge on
the size of that parameter and any future empirical work would need to
account for it.
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Utility maximization is just one part of Vrooman (1997), an extensive
treatment of all ownership, labor, and industrial organization topics for
Major League Baseball. Vrooman (1997, starting on p. 598) refers to it as
joint maximization of team value and satisfaction from winning by the
‘sportsman’ owner.10 The explicit listing of ﬁrst-order conditions, and the
graphical demonstration, backtracks to an optimization problem of the
form:
Max SðVðwÞ;wÞ subject to V[V0 ð7Þ
S is the sportsman owner’s satisfaction function, V the market value of the
team, w the winning percentage.
The ‘satisfaction’ function is clearly a utility function, right down to the
graphical treatment of indiﬀerence curves between team value and winning
percentage. The constraint is a minimum acceptable V to remain in the endea-
vor, the market’s determination of the proﬁtability of the team, essentially the
S/Q-EH constraint. Attendance is not formally included but clearly is sub-
sumed in the idea of just how revenues are generated. The utility function
underlying the analysis is completely general and the essence of the ‘sports-
man owner’ tradeoﬀs is here (although the other usual marginal rate of substi-
tution between winning and other consumption, in Quirk and El Hodiri,
1974, is not).
Vrooman’s (1997) aim with utility maximization is to show the changes that
such an assumption makes on owner choices. The value function is the con-
straint and team value is maximized at marginal value (the slope of the team
market value function) equals zero. However, as indiﬀerence curves between
value and winning have negative slope, satisfaction is maximized at a lower
team value and a higher winning percentage. In an equilibrium of sportsman
owners, their convex tradeoﬀ between team value and winning leads to lower
franchise values than would occur under proﬁt maximization as all attempt to
increase winning relative to proﬁt maximization but cannot do so simulta-
neously, driving up the price of players. He labels the diﬀerence in team value
the ‘sportsman eﬀect’. Vrooman (1997) also shows that sportsman owners
would tend to operate in a league that is more competitively balanced than
under proﬁt maximization.
Vrooman (1997) extends the analysis of the sportsman owner’s tradeoﬀs in
novel ways. First, he extends to the case of syndication (he names it the
‘Steinbrenner Eﬀect’). Second, echoing the earlier observation on the mysteri-
ous Fx in Sloane (1971), he covers the use of ‘other people’s money’, that is,
ﬁnancial leverage by the sportsman owner (his ‘Predators’ Ball Game). The
results of both of these extensions are beyond the ambition in this review and
left to the interested reader.
Dietl et al. (2011b) adopt the same additively separable utility function
approach in Rascher (1997), but do not split their parametric weight between
10 Vrooman (1997) cites Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) throughout his paper, but not on the
‘sportsman owner’ (see the oﬀset quote, above). He does not cite Sloane (1971), either but
then his explicit focus is Major League Baseball.
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proﬁt and winning. Instead, they simply put a ‘win preference’ weight parame-
ter on the winning component:
Max uiðxi; xjÞ ¼ piðxi; xjÞ þ ciwiðxi; xjÞ; ð8Þ
xi is the talent investment by club owner i = 1, 2, pi the proﬁts, required non-
negative, ci the win preference, or the weight that the club owner puts on win-
ning, wi the contest success function.
In terms of generality relative to the S/Q-EH formulation, the observations
about restrictiveness are identical to those made about Rascher (1997). There
is also an explicit speciﬁcation and use of the contest success function with
attribution (both Tullock, 1980; and the overview in Skaperdas, 1996).
The impact of competitive balance is introduced parametrically through the
revenue portion of proﬁts is Riðxi; xjÞ ¼ miwiðxi; xjÞ  b2wiðxi; xjÞ2;where b[ 0
is the eﬀect of competitive balance on club revenues and mi > 0 drawing
potential (sometimes referred to as market size). If talent were measured so
that it creates one more win, the derivative is MRi = mi  b; a suitably large
competitive balance ‘cost’ can wipe out any marginal revenue gains from mar-
ket size. The authors then derive both observations and implications for their
model equilibrium relative to proﬁt maximization in the choice of talent level,
proﬁts, as well as for the impacts of revenue sharing. For example, if
b > mi + mj, then revenue sharing produces more competitive balance.
But, as with the comments on Rascher’s (1997) speciﬁcation, above, crucial
results depend on the size of parameters. Dietl et al. (2011b) add parameters
for competitive balance impacts and market size to a parameter on the club
manager’s weighting of winning vs. proﬁts. Once again, for empirical work,
these would need to be measured and estimated.
The ﬁnal work covered extensively in this section is Madden and Robinson
(2012). They cast the most complete (and in my opinion the most general and
elegant) static speciﬁcation and analysis of the S/Q-EH formulation. They cite
Sloane (1971) and formulate the manager’s maximization problem as addi-
tively separable in proﬁts, winning percentage, and attendance but this last in
a very formal way detailed directly:
Max UiðQi;Qj; piÞ ¼ kiPPiðQi;Qj; piÞ þ kiWWiðQi;Qj; piÞ þ kiFFiðQi;Qj; piÞ
ð9Þ
subject to:
PðQi;Qj; piÞP0:
where, Ui is the club manager utility function, Qi the spending on talent by
club i, pi the ticket price for club i, kiΠ the club manager’s utility weight on
proﬁt, Πi the club proﬁt, kiw the club manager’s utility weight on winning per-
centage, Wi the contest success function, kiF the utility weight on attendance
(fan surplus), Fi the Fan surplus from attendance.
It is easy to see the generality by the inclusion of the Fi part in expres-
sion (9), and that becomes even more apparent below. As with all works to
the time of their writing, they do not include ‘other consumption’. Their treat-
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ment of the contest success function is thorough and leads to a choice that is
a bit diﬀerent than the usual, e.g., expression (3) or (6) (but theoretically justi-
ﬁed for their speciﬁcation).
The ‘attendance’ portion of expression (9) is derived from the aggregate
utility of the club members. That is, club managers include the utility of club
members from their observed demand11:
FiðQi;Qj; piÞ ¼
Z vðQi;QjÞpi
0
li½vðQi;QjÞ  pi  xdx ¼
li½vðQi;QjÞ  pi2
2
ð10Þ
v(Qi, Qj) is the maximum willingness to pay by fans of club i, li the fan base
(number of fans) of club i, x the fan heterogeneity parameter uniform over
the unit interval.
Fans feel an exogenous aﬃnity to either club, but not both. They also vary
in their willingness to pay, by the parameter x. So a fan will demand a ticket
as long as xOvðQi;QjÞ  pi. That way, a fan’s attendance is li [v
(Qi, Qj)  pi], generating gate revenues in the proﬁt function. Fan base is
assumed to exceed stadium capacity.
The authors make the relevant assumptions that put their analysis on Euro-
pean clubs, as opposed to individually owned clubs, and there are a number
of very well presented and careful assumptions that allow the authors to per-
form the optimization in expression (9). Club decisions on talent and spending
are analyzed exhaustively and there is an extension to social welfare. But, as
with the static works before it, there is an added burden on any subsequent
empirical work by the additional parameters speciﬁed, in this case, both the
club manager weight on fan utility and the fan heterogeneity parameter.
The fan welfare component of the club manager objective function in Madden
and Robinson (2012) appears in both Madden (2012, forthcoming). Madden
(2012) oﬀers it up as an alternative club manager utility function with compari-
sons to proﬁt and win maximization outcomes. Madden (forthcoming) uses the
same idea (the club manager’s utility is a function of only the utility of club mem-
bers) and focuses the rest of the speciﬁcation on heterogeneous preferences for
team consumption, owner ﬁnancial injections, and the impact of imposing ﬁnan-
cial fair play in European football. Using only the expression (10) as the form of
the utility function is restrictive in completely obvious ways relative both to Mad-
den and Robinson (2012) and the S/Q-EH formulation. So, there is really no need
for any lengthy treatment of either of these works.
V STANDING ON BIG SHOULDERS (A HOPEFULLY HELPFUL OBSERVATION)
The work covered in the last section exhibits no clearly stated lineage, as
detailed in Table 1. For example, recognition of the S/Q-EH formulation after
11 As Madden and Robinson (2012) note, this speciﬁcation comes directly from Madden
(2012). Readers familiar with the work on social optimality in sports league talent outcomes
will recognize this as the consumers’ surpluses part of those analyses. Madden and Robinson
(2012) also provide some welfare analysis of league equilibria in their Section IV relevant to
the growing literature in that area. See Madden (2012) or Fort and Quirk (2010, 2011), and
the references in Dietl et al. (2011a).
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Kesenne (1996) is spotty at best. Undeniably, a literature that proceeds suc-
cessfully knows its own origins. If nothing else, we would coach our junior
colleagues to carefully place their work in the context of a relevant literature
to enhance chances for publication.
The clear implication for the future is that all roads here lead back to the
seminal S/Q-EH formulation and any future work will owe a debt to some
combination of the other ﬁve papers covered in the last section. In particular,
(1) Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) oﬀer the most general and comprehensive
treatment because it is the only dynamic treatment in the literature and (2)
Madden and Robinson (2012) oﬀer the most general (and elegant) static treat-
ment. Along the way, it would be ﬁtting to acknowledge the ﬁrst appearance
of the contest success function in the proﬁt maximization version in El Hodiri
and Quirk (1971), carried forward in the utility maximization version in Quirk
and El Hodiri (1974).
VI CONCLUSIONS
All said and done, I liken the eﬀorts that went into this paper to an archeo-
logical expedition, spurred on by the original insights from Sloane (1971),
which ended up uncovering Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) in the same sedimen-
tary layer. Of course, it isn’t the archeologist but what the archeologist found
that matters. It is those discoveries that can help future researchers move in
the direction of testable hypotheses about owner objectives. It is gratifying to
bring the dynamic analysis in Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) back to the light of
the present. The additional discovery that they appear to be the ﬁrst to use a
contest success function (in their earlier 1971 piece) in any economics litera-
ture is especially satisfying.
The Sloane (1971) and Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) originals have the power
of usual marginal analysis behind them, plus the generality of dynamics.
Except for Vrooman (1997), the rest of the literature goes down a path with
two characteristics. First, utility functions are additively separable and linear
in some combination of winning, proﬁts, and fan welfare (attendance). I’m
not a theorist and deviations from the fundamental axioms of utility analysis
are for others to deal with. Second, the rest of the literature develops by add-
ing parameters to cover utility weights on winning, proﬁts, and fan welfare
(attendance), as well parameters to represent drawing potential and the impact
of the level of competitive balance on fans. These parameters make the mod-
els mathematically tractable, but produce a challenge to empirical work in
both measurement and estimation. But then there are all manner of really
smart people out there and it will be fun to see how they handle this chal-
lenge.
Finally, while the work detailed here subsequent to S/Q-EH does not recog-
nize its lineage, there is one that is quite easy to follow after the fact. Hope-
fully, the details of that lineage identiﬁed here will aid the development of
future work in the area.
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